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I. INTRODUCTION
Additive manufacturing (“AM”) offers the power to design and cre-
ate in new ways but also brings challenges in intellectual property pro-
tection and unauthorized copying, along with potential liability
issues.1 One growing problem is counterfeiting, which is recognized as
part of a worldwide industry estimated at over $1 trillion.2 “There are
† Dr. Sharon Flank founded InfraTrac in 2006. Her management expertise
reaches back to 1981, managing scientists, academics, and software engineers. She
spent ten years at SRA International, where she wrote the company’s first patent and
helped create companies later sold to AOL and Kodak. She served as Chief Technol-
ogy Officer of eMotion, Inc., where she guided them to their first of many on-time
software releases for an Internet-based commercial product. Dr. Flank is a frequent
speaker on anti-counterfeiting and medication safety. She received her Ph.D. from
Harvard and her A.B. from Cornell.
1. Ariel M. Nissan, Regulating the Three-Dimensional Future: How the FDA
Should Structure a Regulatory Mechanism for Additive Manufacturing (3D Printing),
22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 267, 268 (2016).
2. Counting the Cost of Counterfeiting: A NetNames Report, NETNAMES: A CSC
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two basic paths to creating counterfeits with 3D printing.”3 First, the
print instructions, in the form of a software design file, can be stolen,
shared, or mocked up.4 Alternatively, an existing object “(including a
genuine branded or licensed product)” can be 3D scanned to create a
design file to print a copy.5 “Hybrids of the two paths also exist, for
example, a 3D scan version that is then altered in one or more
characteristics.”6
II. DIGITAL, PHYSICAL, AND CHEMICAL APPROACHES TO
IP PROTECTION
Digital rights management is the standard approach to protecting
creative content in an electronic form.7 However, simply requiring
that the design file contain an authorization code is not enough to
completely prevent 3D counterfeiting.8 “The authorization code vali-
dates the printing process, but it leaves no trace of that validation (or
the lack thereof) on the product that is generated.”9 “A physical 3D
mark[, either printed or added separately,] is minimal protection be-
cause it assumes the ability to tuck away a visible mark unobtru-
sively.”10 An obvious physical mark can be scanned and replicated, so
the knockoff will appear to be genuine as well.11
Given the limitations of digital and physical protections, it makes
sense to explore how chemical marking might work.12 As AM gains
traction in industrial arenas such as aerospace and automotive, coun-
terfeit products made with inferior materials present both an eco-
nomic threat and public safety concerns.13 Chemistry could be used to
validate authorized print materials and curb these concerns, but sim-
ply validating chemical content of a product is generally not enough to
deter sophisticated counterfeiters.14 This method of validation used in
isolation provides insufficient protection, “in the same way that it is
possible to use genuine ink in a genuine printer . . .  to make illegal
copies of a copyrighted work, or to print a plagiarized document.”15
Therefore, a viable chemical approach must be more nuanced to be
3. Sharon Flank, Gary E. Ritchie & Rebecca Maksimovic, Anticounterfeiting Op-
tions for Three-Dimensional Printing, 2 3D PRINTING & ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING




7. See id. at 184.




12. Id. at 181–183.
13. Id. at 181.
14. See id. at 182.
15. Id. at 181.
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successful.16 Accordingly, the chemical taggant solution described in
this Article incorporates elements from digital and physical protection
as well to create more robust IP protection.
Preventing counterfeit products from entering the marketplace is
important to brand owners and important for public safety.17 Brand
owners want a way to ensure that the products in the marketplace are
genuine, both to ensure quality and to ensure that they are getting
paid for their intellectual property.18 They see 3D printing as an op-
portunity and a threat.19 It constitutes an opportunity to offer person-
alized, custom versions of a wide range of products, from shoes to
medical implants.20 However, it also threatens their brand, their qual-
ity, and their market: how can they distinguish a branded athletic shoe
from a knockoff, or a customized medical implant from a dangerous
chunk of plastic, if both are 3D printed?21
Brand owners currently spend millions on ensuring that their prod-
ucts in the marketplace are genuine, “employing quality inspectors,
secret shoppers, security teams and forensic laboratories.”22 In addi-
tion, many incorporating spectroscopic and other chemical analysis
tools.23 “These teams check distributors, monitor suspect products at
customs in cooperation with border authorities, and visit retailers to
monitor their supply chain.”24 When knockoffs slip through, the team
alerts the brand owners.25 This may occur because an unhappy cus-
tomer returns a suspect product, “often because it failed, and the
brand owner’s labs spend time and money searching for the cause of
failure, or attempting to prove that the failed product is in fact a
fake.”26 “Authentication is the fastest-growing segment of the broader
anti-counterfeiting market because faster—and more portable—ways
to check on products save money, time, and reputation.”27 “The ex-
isting anti-counterfeiting effort is, however, insufficient to meet the
challenges of 3D printing.”28
III. PRINCIPLES
Real solutions to 3D IP protection must be “fast, flexible, cost-ef-
fective, scalable . . . and secure.” The table below provides why these
16. See id. at 182.




21. Id. at 181–82.
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principles are necessary and describes how each principle should im-
pact the brand owner or product.
Principles Why? Impact or result
Fast Only fast and easy tests will be Detection should take seconds,
performed and protection should be com-
patible with the production envi-
ronment
Flexible AM is evolving and adding Multi-material solutions have a
materials and methods better chance in the marketplace
Cost-effective Everyone wants IP protection, Solutions should add less than
but no one wants to spend a lot 2% to product price
of money to get it
Scalable AM will not be limited to small Setup and detection should not
batches for much longer require cumbersome equipment
or processes
Secure Security that does not protect It should not be possible to
wastes everyone’s time and counterfeit the anti-counterfeit-
money ing. Covert measures are
stronger because fewer people
need to know about them.
IV. PROTECTING THE FILE IS NOT ENOUGH
3D designs are vulnerable to theft and compromise, including via
cybersecurity breaches and insider personnel.29 These are real con-
cerns: if you can get your hands on the Computer Aided Design
(“CAD”) or .stl files for 3D printing, you can create an object that is
essentially indistinguishable from the real thing.30 Arguably, it is the
real thing, at least if it is made the same way with the same materials
on the same type of printer.31
However, additive manufacturing adds another layer of threat.32 A
counterfeiter or saboteur does not need to have the original design file
to replicate an object.33 Instead, they can 3D scan a genuine article to
create their own version of a design file, and then continue on their
own to make identical copies.34 For the IP owner, this form of copying
is equally disturbing: a competing object enters the marketplace to
29. 3D Opportunity and Cyber Risk Management Additive Manufacturing Secures
the Thread, DELOITTE UNIVERSITY PRESS, https://dupress.deloitte.com/content/dam/
dup-us-en/articles/3292_3D-opportunity-cyber-risk-mgmt/DUP_3D-opportunity-risk-
management.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQJ2-9UD6] [hereinafter 3D Opportunity and
Cyber Risk Management].
30. Thomas Kurfess & William J. Cass, Rethinking Additive Manufacturing and
Intellectual Property Protection, 57 RES.-TECH. MGMT. J., no. 5, 2015, at 37 [hereinaf-
ter Kurfess & Cass].
31. See id.
32. See 3D Opportunity and Cyber Risk Management, supra note 29, at 6.
33. See Kurfess & Cass, surpa note 30, at 36.
34. Flank, Ritchie & Maksimovic, supra note 3, at 181.
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compete with their genuine version.35 It will look similar, but it might
be made of inferior materials or to lesser specifications.36 It may
mimic their trade dress and violate their trademark, compromising
their profit as well as jeopardizing their brand and reputation for qual-
ity. It may violate their patent rights by pretending to be “generic” or
“compatible,” like the Apple iPhone chargers available on the in-
ternet that were recently shown to be 90% fake.37 And, like those
chargers, such products may raise liability issues by catching fire, or
breaking off sharp or choking-hazard pieces.38
V. PROTECTING THE OBJECT: QUICK TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
Ensuring the integrity of additive manufacturing will require cyber-
security and file protections, but real security also demands a technical
solution for authenticating real objects. In the short term, the major
area of concern is spare parts. For example, a person does not want to
be in jeopardy from an inferior fake brake. Particularly, defense, aero-
space, and automotive companies do not want to face liability charges
because they have failed to make it possible to distinguish safe, genu-
ine products. “Encoding the instructions for materials tagging into the
design file makes it possible to use software controls (authorized se-
cure downloads) to limit proliferation of physical copies.”39
A. Taggants
One of the key anti-counterfeiting methods is the use of taggants,
which are generally chemical markers that are invisible to the eye but
detectable with some special method.40
B. Advantages and Disadvantages
A covert measure offers the advantage that the would-be counter-
feiter has no clue that it is present or where to find it.41 Covert mea-
sures make it harder for a counterfeiter to replicate the object because
35. See Kurfess & Cass, surpa note 30, at 37.
36. Id.
37. E.g. Amit Chowdhry, Apple: Nearly 90% Of ‘Genuine’ iPhone Chargers On
Amazon Are Counterfeit, WORLD NEWS (Oct. 24, 2016) https://breaking.com.ng/world
news/apple-nearly-90-of-genuine-iphone-chargers-on-amazon-are-counterfeit/ [https:/
/perma.cc/CN6Y-9RSB].
38. What You Need to Know About Deadly Counterfeits, CONSUMER REPORTS
(Aug. 18, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/08/deadly-
counterfeits/index.htm [https://perma.cc/UXG7-ZHLH]; see generally VICTORIA A.
ESPINEL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (2010): ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
U. S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 42 (2011), https://
www.ice.gov/doclib/iprcenter/pdf/ipec-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WWP-
UTLU].
39. Flank, Ritchie & Maksimovic, supra note 3, at 181.
40.  Id.
41. Id. at 184.
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the counterfeiter must replicate the anti-counterfeiting taggant. When
taggants are too obvious, counterfeiters can find and copy them easily:
if genuine products have a blue stripe, soon fake products will sport a
blue stripe too.42 Similarly, if genuine product shows taggant under
ultraviolet light, counterfeiters will use UV taggant too. Unfortu-
nately, it is also possible to err in the other direction by making tag-
gants too complex. Scalability suffers when the taggant has rare
ingredients that have limited sources or when the taggant needs to be
specially manufactured.43
Ease of detection affects cost, scalability, and ultimately security.
For example, easy tests are performed frequently, while complex,
time-consuming, or destructive analysis is rarer, so more counterfeited
products can slip through the cracks. It might seem that the best tests
are consumer-level checks, perhaps with a smartphone.44  However,
experience in the pharmaceutical industry suggests that the last pro-
fessional with a stake in quality is the right person to rely on for au-
thentication. Most U.S. prescription vials now include a description of
the physical properties of the drugs inside, e.g. “oval white tablet.”45
As a thoughtful, careful consumer, do you make a habit of checking
those descriptions so you can avoid fakes and mistakes? Most people
do not: we are in a hurry, and we depend on quality checks by others.
From a legal standpoint, a harmed consumer has standing to seek a
remedy, but unless the harm is physical or egregious, they are unlikely
to do so. It is the brand owner who has the most to lose, in terms of
market harm to sales and reputation, and therefore it is the brand
owner who is most likely to invest in protections, whether under man-
date or not.46
C. Chemical Anti-Counterfeiting
Additive manufacturing can draw on some of the experience in the
broader anti-counterfeiting arena.47 Many products, including luxury
goods and licensed products (e.g., team merchandise) have relied on
visible marks to reassure consumers. These include holograms on tags
and packaging, and even in the product, along with color-shifting inks
and marks detectable under ultraviolet light.48 Unfortunately, coun-
terfeiters have moved into counterfeiting the anti-counterfeiting. All
those measures have been compromised. One major U.S. pharmaceu-
tical company reported that when it introduced a new drug, the coun-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 182.
44. See generally id.
45. See generally id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ian Lancaster, Trends: Holograms and Anticounterfeiting, PHARMTECH.COM
(Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.pharmtech.com/trends-holograms-and-anticounterfeiting
[https://perma.cc/6EN8-SFW9].
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terfeit was already in place. The counterfeiters had put a hologram on
the package; although, the genuine product did not use a hologram.49
To the company’s frustration, consumers showed a preference for the
real-seeming product—the counterfeit with the hologram.50 Although
consumers can be reassured with an overt mark, the counterfeiter
benefits from being told exactly what needs to be copied.
Beyond the standard overt/covert dichotomy, additive manufactur-
ing presents additional constraints. Packaging protections are not par-
ticularly relevant because most 3D printing processes involve heat,
limiting some technological solutions such as DNA-based taggants.51
The availability of 3D scanning makes visible marking far less useful
because any mark you can put on the outside of an object can be
scanned and therefore replicated on the fake object as well.52
1. UV or Fluorescence
Ultraviolet or fluorescent taggants are a good first-line protector
but are broadly available to counterfeiters and often spoofed.
2. Chemical Fingerprinting
One authentication solution garnering attention uses covert chemi-
cal tagging.53 In a multi-material build, it is possible to include a small
amount of a different chemical mix as an under-the-skin chemical tag-
gant.54 InfraTrac’s chemical fingerprinting hides a covert taggant in-
side the matrix print material like a spot of peanut butter and jelly
inside a 3D printed sandwich (as illustrated below).55 For polymers,
the detector of choice is a near-infrared (“NIR”) spectrometer, now
available from several vendors in highly accurate, pocket-sized ver-
sions.56 One advantage to InfraTrac’s method is that NIR spectros-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See generally Fabbaloo, 3D Printing with DNA-Based “Smart Glue”, ENGI-
NEERING.COM (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.engineering.com/3DPrinting/3DPrintingAr-
ticles/ArticleID/9576/3D-Printing-with-DNA-Based-Smart-Glue.aspx [https://
perma.cc/W2X7-2L2P].
52. See Sarah Anderson Goehrke, Anti-Counterfeiting Measures Have a Lot to Of-
fer in 3D Printing – A Few Questions For: IntraTrac, 3DPRINT.COM (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://3dprint.com/121550/a-few-questions-for-infratrac [https://perma.cc/P758-36N7]
[hereinafter Goehrke].
53. See generally Available Authentication Technologies for the Prevention and De-
tection of SSFFC Medical Products, World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/
medicines/regulation/ssffc/mechanism/A70_23-en15-32.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBW6-
XUT3].
54. Goehrke, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. See generally NIR Spectroscopy Unbound, OCEAN OPTICS (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://oceanoptics.com/nir-spectroscopy-unbound [https://perma.cc/5F8Y-D24T].
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copy fingerprints the whole sandwich, so a “genuine” reading is a
robust match of the object’s material profile.57
58
A 3D scanner only sees the shape, color, and texture—not chemical
composition—so a covert chemical fingerprint will not be replicated in
the copy.59 Chemical analysis techniques, including spectroscopy, are
increasingly portable and easy to use, making authentication possible
in the field, not just in the lab.60 The techniques of choice are non-
destructive and instant, because a point-and-shoot test has multiple
advantages. First, easy tests are more likely to be integrated into stan-
dard procedures and less likely to be skipped. The Global Pharma
Health Fund sent Minilab test kits to Africa and was frustrated by the
fact that the fastest, easiest—but least accurate—test in the kit re-
ceived the most use.61 Second, a fast, non-destructive test can be re-
peated at customs or in front of a jury, conveying that the item is
counterfeit.
Spectroscopy is ideal for anti-counterfeiting because it is not a sin-
gle-ingredient test.62 Instead, spectroscopy looks for a match to a
stored profile—a gold standard. That is, for an object consisting of
ABCDEF, it looks for a match (within a specified percentage) of
ABCDEF. Other taggant schemes that look for a marker, i.e., “Is
57. See CAMO Software Partners With InfraTrac to Provide Anti-Counterfeiting
Solutions to the Pharmaceutical Industry, CAMO (Feb. 28, 2009), http://
www.camo.com/news-events/press-release/Partner-InfraTrac-anti-counterfeiting-solu
tions.html [https://perma.cc/7URM-E5SJ].
58. Goehrke, supra note 52.
59. Flank, Ritchie & Maksimovic, supra note 3, at 184–86.
60. Ravi Kalyanaraman et al., Portable Spectrometers for Pharmaceutical Counter-
feit Detection, AM. PHARMACEUTICAL REV. (2010), http://www.americanpharmaceuti
calreview.com/Featured-Articles/116641-Portable-Spectrometers-for-Pharmaceutical-
Counterfeit-Detection/ [https://perma.cc/3PRS-Q632].
61. See generally The GPHF-Minilab™ - Protection Against Counterfeit
Medicines, (last visited 03/31/17) https://www.gphf.org/en/minilab [https://perma.cc/
8WCW-PE9E].
62. Flank, Ritchie & Maksimovic, supra note 3, at 183.
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there any C in that ABCDEF?” are more vulnerable to spoofing. For
example, infant formula in China was tested for protein content, but
cheaper melamine plastic powder gives a false positive result, and is,
unsurprisingly, a dangerous ingredient with harmful consequences.63
Similarly, diethylene glycol has been used as a cheap substitute for
glycerin in toothpaste, with sometimes toxic effects. Both were cases
of looking for a marker, a “C” in the ABCDEF matrix, rather than a
full chemical match of all of ABCDEF.64
A widely-used printer for additive manufacturing applications
comes from Stratasys and uses fused deposition modeling (“FDM”).65
This is the printer used for the tests shown below, with tests on other
materials and printers detailed in previous work.66 Stratasys provides
a broad set of thermoplastics compatible with its FDM printer.67 A
test keyring of samples was procured through InfraTrac’s America
Makes Challenge award, and tests were performed to determine two
outcomes: first, whether it was possible to use spectroscopy to distin-
guish the print materials, and second, whether they could be sand-
wiched to create a covert internal fingerprint using InfraTrac’s
patented approach.
63. Questions and Answers on melamine, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://
www.who.int/csr/media/faq/QAmelamine/en/ [https://perma.cc/CA6X-QPTY]; FDA
Advises Consumers to Avoid Toothpaste from China Containing Harmful Chemical
FDA Detains One Contaminated Shipment, U.S. FDA, https://wayback.archive-it.org/
7993/20170113085659/ http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce
ments/2007/ucm108927.htm [https://perma.cc/V5Y3-FUQS].
64. See Tong Wu, et al., Identification and Quantitation of Melamine in Milk by
Near-Infrared Spectroscopy and Chemometrics, 2016 J. SPECTROSCOPY 1, 3 (2016),
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/jspec/2016/6184987/ [https://perma.cc/TV2D-
4UVR]; Ian Robertson, Detection of Adulteration of Glycerol with Diethylene Glycol
by Infrared Spectroscopy, PERKIN ELMER 2–3 (2014), https://www.perkinelmer.com/
lab-solutions/resources/docs/APP_Detection_Adulteration_Glycerol_DiethyleneGly
col_IR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S86-UD9G].
65. FDM Technology, STRATASYS (2017), http://www.stratasys.com/3d-printers/
technologies/fdm-technology [https://perma.cc/DM4Q-F63D].
66. Flank, Ritchie & Maksimovic, supra note 3, at 184.
67. FDM Thermoplastics, STRATASYS (2017), http://www.stratasys.com/materials/
fdm [https://perma.cc/V3SK-SVFG].
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White plastic is white plastic . . . or is it? In the visible light region, the
spectrometer sees what your eye sees. In the near-infrared, the spec-
trometer sees chemical composition.
The keyring contains a range of materials, but the most common—
and the material used in the brightly colored samples—is acrylonitrile
butadiene styrene (“ABS”). This hard plastic is familiar because it is
used to make most Lego bricks.68 The graphs below show how two
materials might look the same but not be the same, using two kinds of
chemical spectroscopy for analysis. In the visual range (400-700nm,
marked with a violet-to-red rainbow), the spectrometer sees what the
68. Jacob Koffler, Lego Wants to Replace Plastic Blocks with Sustainable Materials,
TIME, June 23, 2015, http://time.com/3931946/lego-sustainable-materials/ [https://
perma.cc/ELU3-K9KP].
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human eye sees,69 but in a different wavelength range. In the near-
infrared range, the spectrometer sees chemical bonds.70 In the visual
range, colors will show up differently but materials will not be distin-
guishable.71 In the near-infrared, materials will show up differently,
but colors will not be distinguishable.72
D. How Are Materials Suppliers Relevant to the Solution?
The availability of high-quality materials will drive the adoption of
additive manufacturing.73 Those AM products will need to be
marked—likely chemically—to protect the intellectual property in the
proprietary materials.74 Forward-looking printer companies, and the
69. Light and photosynthetic pigments, KHANACADEMY, https://www.khanacade
my.org/science/biology/photosynthesis-in-plants/the-light-dependent-reactions-of-
photosynthesis/a/light-and-photosynthetic-pigments [https://perma.cc/ND8C-9FQC].
70. See A.M.C. Davies, An Introduction to Near Infrared (NIR) Spectroscopy, IM
PUBLICATIONS, https://www.impublications.com/content/introduction-near-infrared-
nir-spectroscopy [https://perma.cc/2SD2-BCJG].
71. See generally William Reusch, VIRTUAL TEXTBOOK OF ORGANIC CHEMISTRY,
VISIBLE AND ULTRAVIOLET SPECTROSCOPY (1999) https://www2.chemistry.msu.edu/
faculty/reusch/VirtTxtJml/Spectrpy/UV-Vis/spectrum.htm [https://perma.cc/E6Y3-
RYNL].
72. See generally A.M.C. Davies, supra note 70.
73. Simon Ford & Mélanie Despeisse, Additive Manufacturing and Sustainability:
An Exploratory Study of the Advantages and Challenges, 137 J. OF CLEANER PRODUC-
TION 1573, 1581 (2016), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652
616304395 [https://perma.cc/58BZ-9DHK].
74. Thomas Prock, Additive Manufacturing – IP Challenges in Modern Day Manu-
facturing, MARKS & CLERK (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.marks-clerk.com/Home/
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materials companies that supply them, will offer pre-vetted sets of ma-
trix materials and taggants, with custom mixes available for additional
security.75 As more complex materials can be 3D printed, the oppor-
tunity expands: electronics can be printed directly into plastics,76 as
well as into biologic tissue.77
VI. PROTECTING THE OBJECT: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Existing precedent concerning anti-counterfeiting suggests a work-
ing model for IP protection as well as enforcement that can be ex-
tended to additive manufacturing.78 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2320, the legal
remedies against the trafficking of counterfeit goods or services in-
clude criminal prosecution, civil seizures, import penalties, and en-
hanced civil damages.79
Much of the current enforcement effort is geared to halting infring-
ing goods at U.S. borders, a good model when foreign counterfeit
goods are created cheaply in foreign countries and imported.80 It is,
however, possible that 3D printing will disrupt this assumption as it
disrupts manufacturing, since it facilitates small-scale, distributed con-
trol of counterfeited goods manufacturing.81
Some of the successful prosecutions for selling counterfeit goods
have gone after large marketplaces such as Alibaba and eBay.82 Al-
though the actual creators of the counterfeit goods are hard to locate,
they still need access to legitimate markets to sell their products. In
the emerging 3D printing market, it is reasonable to expect that en-
forcement targets will also include larger players. In particular, users
of components and spare parts are highly motivated to protect them-
Knowledge-News/Articles/3D-printing-Additive-Manufacturing-challenges.aspx#.WN
gnUmUmFlI [https://perma.cc/K7S7-ACL5].
75. Michael Molitch-Hou, Best 3D Printer Materials: Carbon Fiber Edition, ENGI-
NEERING.COM (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.engineering.com/3DPrinting/3DPrinting
Articles/ArticleID/12957/categoryId/20/Best-3D-Printer-Materials-Carbon-Fiber-Edi
tion.aspx [https://perma.cc/CA2P-49XL].
76. J.E. Pierce & S. J. Schwarz, IP Strategies for the Rise of 3D Printing, VENABLE
LLP (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.venable.com/ip-strategies-for-the-rise-of-3d-printing
-04-14-2015/ [https://perma.cc/ND49-7V6K].
77. 3D Bioprinting of Living Tissues, WYSS INSTITUTE, https://wyss.harvard.edu/
technology/3d-bioprinting/ [https://perma.cc/YQ26-XBBP].
78. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2017) (showing the legal framework concern-
ing the trafficking of counterfeit goods or services).
79. Id.




82. See Gillian Wong, Alibaba Sued Over Alleged Counterfeits, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (May 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-sued-over-alleged-
counterfeits-1431877734 [https://perma.cc/94CB-PSYM]; see also Doreen Carvajal,
EBay Ordered to Pay $61 Million in Sale of Counterfeit Goods, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/technology/01ebay.html [https://perma.cc/
872A-X9RB].
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selves as well as their customers against potentially inferior or even
dangerous counterfeits. We consider some examples below.
A. Example A: Marked Parts
A toaster explodes and injures Alex. The toaster, made by TOAST-
ERS, Inc., is found to include a defective 3D-printed part that failed
and caused the explosion. Is TOASTERS, Inc. liable? TOASTERS,
Inc. claims that GREAT3DPARTS supplied the part to them. Is
GREAT3DPARTS liable? GREAT3DPARTS assert that its parts
never fail, and in fact, the part that was in the offending toaster was
not theirs at all. Additionally, GREAT3DPARTS asserts that
TOASTERS, Inc. received the part from a distributor, MIDDLE, and
that both MIDDLE and TOASTERS, Inc. failed to check that the
part was genuine.
When all the companies involved do not take responsibility, which
of them is liable for the exploding toaster? If GREAT3DPARTS
marks its parts and makes it possible to authenticate them, it avoids
liability. If TOASTERS, Inc. requires that their suppliers mark their
parts and that distributors like MIDDLE check parts, it avoids
liability.
In this example, it becomes evident that the ease of authentication
has an influence on enforcement. If authentication is a complex, lab-
based process requiring expert scientists, neither TOASTERS, Inc.
nor its distributor MIDDLE are likely to take on the burden of test-
ing. However, if they expect major losses, either from counterfeiters
eating into their profits or from liability lawsuits, they may invest in
this type of authentication process.
B. Example B: Unmarked Parts
Consider the same exploding toaster, supplied the same way, but
with no anti-counterfeiting mark. Alex asserts that TOASTERS, Inc.
sold a defective and dangerous product. TOASTERS, Inc. looks to
MIDDLE (who supplied the part) and GREAT3DPARTS, who may
or may not have been its creator. None of them can show the offend-
ing part was not theirs. They cannot even show that they exercised
care to protect the consumer from supply chain threats. TOASTERS,
Inc., MIDDLE, and GREAT3DPARTS are all exposed to liability—
and Alex has been exposed to real danger—from unmarked 3D
printed parts.
C. Example C: Defense Procurement
Counterfeit electronic parts are a major issue plaguing the U.S. De-
partment of Defense, and the emergence of 3D printed electronics
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threatens to make the problem far worse.83 Non-3D testing now relies
on SAE AS6171.84 Charged with managing counterfeit electronic
parts, the Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”) requires that contrac-
tors police their suppliers and document the results of either traceabil-
ity or a test on DLA L&M Form 918. This process requires a chain of
suppliers policing their own suppliers and provide documentation.85
To some extent this approach relies on the good faith of the con-
tracting community—perhaps a lot to ask as counterfeiting becomes
ever easier and more lucrative.
D. Advantages of Non-Destructive Testing: Juries and More
It seems clear that there will be a growing need for testing and au-
thentication as replication (authorized or not) becomes easier. It is
worth noting that non-destructive tests offer considerable advantages
in the field and in court. A juror who sees a chemical test is more
likely to be convinced than a juror who hears an expert witness testify
about what happened in a lab test. Currently, U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection helps protect the United States’ IP by performing se-
lected field-friendly tests themselves.86 Fast, easy, and non-destructive
tests serve their needs as well.
VII. LOOKING AHEAD
There is no doubt that additive manufacturing can have transforma-
tive effects in a wide range of industries.87 In a future in which every-
one wears well-fitted, custom shoes, and spare parts are always “in
stock,” perhaps the most exciting developments will come in the medi-
cal arena, as stem cell printing joins with embedded sensors and elec-
tronics. Technological advances will offer new opportunities to define
what a genuine product might be. In addition, a new territory for eth-
ics and IP law will emerge.
83. See Symposium on Counterfeit Parts and Materials, Counterfeit Electronic
Parts and Electronic Supply Chain Symposium, SMTA, (Mar. 24, 2017), http://
www.smta.org/counterfeit/tech.cfm [https://perma.cc/3N7S-8JVM] (The U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense devotes considerable attention to the issue of counterfeit
electronics).
84. Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical,
Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts, SAE INTERNATIONAL, http://standards.sae.
org/wip/as6171/ [https://perma.cc/U35B-UXPV].
85. See Counterfeit Detection and Avoidance Program (CDAP), DEFENSE LOGIS-
TICS AGENCY, http://www.dla.mil/LandandMaritime/Business/Selling/Counterfeit-De
tection-Avoidance-Program/ [https://perma.cc/92SC-MQB2].
86. See Headquarters Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate, U.S. CUS-
TOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/about/labs-scientific-svcs/org-
operations [https://perma.cc/7BX2-6RK6] (last updated Feb. 28, 2017).
87. See Thomas Campbell, 3D Printing Will Be a Counterfeiter’s Best Friend, SCI-
ENTIFIC AMERICAN (Dec. 5, 2013) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/3-d-
printing-will-be-a-counterfeiters-best-friend [https://perma.cc/PB7W-56WC]; See also
Ritchie Flank, Anti-Counterfeiting Options for 3D Printing, 2 3D PRINTING & ADDI-
TIVE MANUFACTURING 180, 180–89 (2015).
